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Introduction
China, in territorial terms, is the second
largest country in the world after Canada. It is
also the most populous state on earth with an
estimated population in 1990 of 1.1 billion
people. Under socialist rule, China adopted a
closed-door policy for almost 30 years from
1949. This closure rendered non-China-
based research on the Chinese economy an
almost exclusive domain of a few “China
experts” whose opinions were regarded as
being authoritative. The opening of the coun-
try and the resulting rapid economic progress
under the leadership of Deng Xiao Ping on
the one hand, and the collapse of the commu-
nist regimes of the Soviet Union and the
Warsaw Pact states on the other, have kindled
great academic interest in the economic
reforms of China. In the context of improved
accessibility to reliable data under the liberal-
ization policy, the scope of academic research
in the Chinese economy is immense. Research
on the real estate market of China, in particu-
lar, is driven by both theoretical and practical
interests. 
Many scholars are interested in knowing
whether the so-called “go capitalist” econom-
ic attempts of China are consistent with the
official adherence to the socialist political
stance. In terms of practice, practitioners in
the rapidly expanding Chinese property
market require better informed analysis
beyond official propaganda or mere “facts”
gathering.
The literature generated reveals a number
of theoretical issues which reflect on the
infancy of the field resulting from past
neglect. While some of the issues identified
may be a matter of semantics, most of them
are likely to be the result of the absence of
paradigms for theoretical articulation. This
article gives a synoptic account of some theo-
retical issues identified in the literature and
some property rights aspects of the “land use
rights” reform of the real estate market in
China. This may help in stimulating more
rigorous academic inquiry into the subject
area.
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Is China’s “land use rights” legislation which distinguishes
transferable “land use rights” and inalienable “land
ownership”, a novel concept unknown to human kind
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rights system abolished by the communist revolution?
Advocates the view that the latter is a more correct
interpretation. As part of a “going capitalist” economic
reform programme, such a reversion is manifested in the
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such as valuation and land surveying.
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Theoretical issues
The existing academic literature on China’s real
estate market available to the English-speaking
world is extremely scarce. Most of the leading
works are articles in academic journals and text
books written by the academics of the 
University of Hong Kong[1-7].
However, many other Hong Kong-based
academics and practitioners have expressed
views on the phenomena and policies towards
the real estate market in local professional
journals, financial magazines, newspapers and
Chinese books which are closely monitored by
the Chinese authorities. Such views are worth
attention as they exert considerable influence,
not only on the policy makers and politicians,
but also on students. 
Walker and Li[5, p. 210], in their paper on
land use rights reform, consider that “to con-
clude with any hint of certainty on [the property
market of] China is to show extraordinary
arrogance. It is too vast, too complex and cur-
rently subject to too many changes”. Similarly,
McKinnell and Walker argue that “attempting
to put anything in print about China and its
land reforms is extremely dangerous because
the system is so dynamic that whatever one may
have written is probably well on the way to being
out of date and secondly because things are
never quite as they seem”[7].
Indeed, the hectic mass media in Hong
Kong frequently reports opinions about eco-
nomic analysis of the Chinese economy which
echo such a prudent view. At one extreme,
there is the view that western economic theories
are categorically deceptive propaganda which
fail to explain the economic phenomena in
China. This idea is predicated on the erroneous
reasoning that “western” economic theories (in
fact, price theory) would work only under
conditions of perfect competition and the
absence of government intervention. As the
economic reality of China (and indeed, of the
world) is replete with “imperfections”, and
world trade is everywhere ordered by protec-
tionism, laissez-faire policy prescriptions based
on the static laws of demand and supply and
comparative advantage must be wrong. 
One can vaguely depict from such a view a
Lange[8] model of “market socialism” which
envisages micro economic liberalization within
a state governed under a macro-economics
planning framework, a line of thought underly-
ing the economic ideology of some conservative
Chinese leaders. Such an extreme view is defin-
itively unacceptable to the professional econo-
mist. 
At another extreme stand the views of those
economists trained in the neoclassical tradition
who are bewildered by the observation that
China is “too vast, too complex and currently
subject to too many changes”. They avoid
making any theoretical generalizations and
resort to “culture” or to “ideology” to explain
eco-political phenomena. 
While “culture” and “ideology” as forms of
institutions are parameters or constraints for
economic behaviour[9], there is a danger that
such cultural explanations may degenerate into
ad hoc theories with limited predictive value or
testable implications expected of empirical
economic reasoning. In the final analysis,
culture and ideology themselves need explana-
tion. 
It is probably due to the influence of the
above ideas that even formal academic papers
in some real estate journals tend to adopt an
eclectic approach in interpreting real estate
affairs in China. The resulting theoretical issues
are as follows. First, there is an absence of
paradigms or theoretical frameworks which are
essential for generating holistic views or testable
hypotheses typical of a mature academic field.
Second, there is a tendency to invoke concepts
of contradictory ideologies without specifying
one’s position. Marxist economic concepts are
problematic in terms of the received price
theory; for instance, notions like socialist cen-
tral planning displaces not only the market but
also the law of demand and supply, and goods
without “prices” have zero value. These
notions are often mixed up with a “free marke-
teer’s” critique of the socialist system for being
“inefficient” or “wasteful”, a comment which
makes little sense for ignoring the relevant
constraints of the socialist system. (If “efficien-
cy” is defined as constrained
maximization[10].) Third, most authors do not
make any reference to the huge body of litera-
ture on land tenure and urban development, or
compare the land use rights reform to the
method of land allocation and management
practised in Hong Kong, on which the Chinese
reforms model themselves. (Evers[11] made a
similar comment about development in the
Third World two decades ago.) Such a compar-
ison could be more effective in initiating the
interest of a foreign reader who would be more
familiar with the Hong Kong system firmly
based on common law and the market econo-
my. Some commentators apparently have over-
emphasized the “uniqueness” of the Chinese
economy and hence the alleged impossibility of
generalizing the Chinese reforms.
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Instead of dwelling on individual theoretical
problems identified in the aforesaid literature,
the rest of this article is devoted to characteriz-
ing the nature of China’s real estate market and
the land use rights reforms in terms of the
property rights paradigm as developed by
Coase[12,13] and Cheung[10, 14-17], making
comparisons with the Hong Kong system
where appropriate. The hypothesis is that the
scale, complexity and speed of real estate devel-
opment does not entail that theorization is
impossible.
The property rights aspects of the China
real estate market and the land use
rights reforms 
The “dark age” before the communist
take-over of 1949: prevailing private
property rights over land
With two brief exceptions one as an alien force
(imperialism) and the other a brief period in the
end of the Qing Dynasty [early 20th century]
where a capitalist structure briefly emerged in
an embryonic form China has never known
Capitalism[2, p. 59].
It is incorrect to argue that China had little
experience of capitalism until the economic
reforms of Deng Xiao Ping, if the ambiguous
word “capitalism” refers to “a form of market
economy based on private property rights”.
Indeed, imperial China was the first country in
the world to use paper currency and cheques
(Marco Polo was a witness to these instru-
ments) which are basic elements of a market
economy. As far as landed property was con-
cerned, the establishment of private property
rights predated the emergence of the English
freehold system. An elaborated system of land
title and use registration was devised as the
basis of taxation to support the expenses of the
absolute and centralized monarchy. If “capital-
ism” refers to the modern factory system using
western technology and financial institutions, it
took root in the ports and cities where western
powers obtained extra-territorial privileges in
the late nineteenth century. Official Chinese
history has been describing China under the
Nationalist rule as a “nationalist” capitalist
regime. Shanghai in the twentieth century
before the communist take-over of 1949 had all
the symptoms of “capitalism” denounced by
the Marxist economist: hyperinflation, capital-
labour conflict, speculations on shares and
property, etc. The communists publicized all
social institutions prior to the Revolution,
including private property, as phenomena of a
dark age characterized by internal oppression
and foreign expropriation.
In any event, it is an important fact to note
that the Chinese people had a long history of
private property rights in land, unlike many
other “developing world” countries which have,
to date, retained different forms of communal
or customary land tenure inhibiting develop-
ment. The question of tackling the problems
posed by communal or customary land tenure
has remained an important policy considera-
tion in many developing world countries. Cus-
tomary land tenure is a viable and rational
economic, social and environmental solution to
the “tragedy of the commons” (common prop-
erty) for a small-scale subsistence economy.
However, such a communal property rights
system is far too uncertain and constrained for
a growing population and the development of a
market economy based on sophisticated divi-
sion of labour. 
Under communal rights, the individual’s
freedom to use, derive income from and trans-
fer or subdivide use and income rights is either
denied or subject to a collective decision, which
involves huge and prohibitive transaction costs.
Some colonial powers like those in Latin Amer-
ica and Australia successfully displaced the
indigenous communal land system by a private
property system in the form of freehold tenure.
Many others allowed the customary system to
operate in the rural areas while implanting
private property in the form of freehold or
leasehold in the urban cores, in order to pacify
the indigenous people.
To pave the way for economic development,
many colonial governments took the opportu-
nities of constitutional change of forthcoming
independence to carry out land reforms by
replacing the customary land tenure, which was
believed to be a hindrance to incentive. For
instance, the Report of the East African Royal
Commission recommended the granting of
individual freehold titles of land to replace the
communal systems in the East African
colonies[18,19].
In more recently decolonized countries in
the South Pacific and in Australia, there is a
recent revival of, or reversion to, customary
land tenure[20]. “Independent governments in
Melanesia have begun to roll the process of
alienation back, by returning government and
even private freehold land to the descendants of
the people thought to have lost it. The Fiji
government, for example, recently announced
it would be returning land it owned”[21, 
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p. 45]. In Australia, the Native Title Land Act
established the communal rights of the 
Aborigines and Torres Straits Islanders, against
freehold and leasehold interests created by
colonialists[22].
This revival or reversionary process is partly
due to the growing concern for democracy,
human rights, cultural rights and local partic-
ipation by the ex-colonial overlords. The result
is that modern market, transactions and plan-
ning are becoming more and more constrained
by communal interests and the ensuing transac-
tion costs of bargaining.
While criticizing the Chinese land market at
present for “the irrational and profligate way in
which the property rights system has been
operated”[23], the commentators have omitted
the fact that the current land rights system in
China is far less uncertain than the customary
land tenure system prevailing in many other
developing countries because of the early incep-
tion of private property rights, as mentioned
above, and the great reduction in the transac-
tion costs of land assembly and measurement
owing to the high-handed policies of the social-
ist government. 
Like the English proprietor possessing a
freehold estate, the China proprietors before
the communist take-over had, subject to the law
and policies of the day, the three characteristics
of private property rights identified by 
Cheung[14], namely:
(1) freedom to use land for whatever purpose;
(2) freedom to derive income from the land
uses chosen;
(3) freedom to alienate, transfer, subdivide or
agglomerate the use and income
rights[24,25].
Voluntary contracts were the basis of the rights
transfer. 
Under Imperial and Nationalist rule, most
land rights transfer needed to be evidenced in
writing and/or registered if they were to be
enforced at court. While such a land system did
exist in a period labelled as “feudalism” by the
dogmatic Marxist scholar of history, it was
definitely the precondition for a market transac-
tion of land, according to “Coase Theorem”
expressed in Coase’s article, “The federal
communications commission”[12]. This theo-
rem reads “the delimitations of rights is an
essential prelude to market transaction”. How-
ever, like many countries with a freehold sys-
tem, China’s private land, notably rural land,
before the Communist Revolution was under
fragmented ownership. In addition, agricultural
land parcels in China were typically irregular in
shape. These conditions created huge transac-
tion costs for land assembly and measurement.
With hindsight, the post-revolution collec-
tivization of rural land bluntly transformed
fragmented and irregular rural land holdings
into consolidated and more rectilinear land
lots[26-28]. The drastic reduction in transac-
tion costs of land assembly and measurement
allows for the speedy development of large-
scale, comprehensively-planned residential
estates today.
Replacement of private property rights
by socialist rank hierarchy
The communist takeover in 1949 soon led to
the “nationalization” of urban land during the
“Great Leap Forward” (1957-1962) and the
“Cultural Revolution” (1966-1978) and the
“Collectivization” of rural land (1963-1965).
Few authors, however, clearly explained the
meaning of these propagandized policies. What
is the difference, for instance, between “nation-
alization of development rights” in the UK
under the post-war town and country planning
reforms and “nationalization of urban land” in
China? What is the difference between “nation-
alization” of land in Hong Kong, which has a
leasehold instead of a freehold system, and
“nationalization” of land in China? What is the
difference between urban land “nationaliza-
tion” and rural land “collectivization”? More
importantly, what is the fundamental alteration
to the pre-existing “ownership” rights?
Attempts to answer these questions by many
authors, such as Selden[25], often create more
confusion (see Evers[11]). Cheung’s[14] three
private property rights characteristics referred
to above provide a powerful and convenient
analytical framework to address these questions
in a theoretically more consistent and useful
way.
Communist ideology condemns property
ownership for being the basis of class exploita-
tion. Ownership of landed property by the
original proprietors was accordingly abolished.
However, in practice, it is a myth that landed
property therefore became “common proper-
ty”, in the sense that no one had any rights over
the property so that they were open to appro-
priation by anyone “according to needs” in the
communist utopia as envisaged by Marx. The
reason is simply that this scenario of “common
property” would, under competition, reduce
the worth (economic rent) of the property to
zero. In terms of economic jargon, this process
is called “rent dissipation”. Private property
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rights is in fact a system of rules constraining
competition. (For an empirical study of the
economic impact of assigning exclusive proper-
ty rights over a “common” resource, see[29].)
Competition is a social concept because it
cannot occur when there is only one person in
the world. The concept of “ownership” is a
social means to deal with competition. It
denotes certain rules delineating the relation-
ship between the “owner” and the rest of the
world with respect to an object or property. The
concept of ownership is unintelligible without
reference to relationships among people. 
As private property rights, as a system of
rules constraining competition, was abolished,
the new communist government had to devise
an alternative system to take its place to avoid
full rent dissipation. The solution of the com-
munist regime was to reassign some of the three
elements of rights enjoyed by the proprietors to
the party members in charge of land matters.
The decisions of these party members,
however, was not unrestrained. As market
transactions, based on the freedom of contract,
were completely superseded by central eco-
nomic planning, the rights of party members in
respect of land uses and the generation of
income were restricted, and the transfer of such
rights became almost completely dependent on
state planning. Comprehensive planning, of
course, was just an impossible ideal, and there
were certainly many grey areas over which a
party member had to exercise discretion.
It was therefore more accurate to say that the
private property rights of the original propri-
etors were transformed into the discretionary
rights of the party members to direct the uses of
resources within a central economic planning
system. The extent of such discretionary rights
depended entirely on their rank in the party
hierarchy. 
As certain rights were not clearly specified, a
degree of rent dissipation was inevitable. When
compared to the private property rights sys-
tems, such dissipation could be said to be
“inefficient”. However, in terms of the newly
adopted system of central economic planning
and the socialist rights system, “inefficiency”
did not exist because under a different set of
objective constraints, including ideology, the
system had already adopted the best possible
arrangement to avoid total chaos and famine.
Such an arrangement was upheld at great
political transaction costs: frequent indoctrina-
tion, periodic purges, constant monitoring of
expression of ideas and social behaviour and
the restriction in the liberty of movement and
child bearing.
It should not be presupposed that because
the price mechanism was displaced by plan-
ning, as suggested by Walker and Li[5], land
became valueless or ceased to be a factor of
production. That such values were not allowed
to be reflected in terms of price signals does not
mean that they disappear. Value exists so long
as there is competition over scarce land
resources. One major source of competition is
the choice between industry and agriculture.
Prioritizing these competing sectors not
uncommonly led to disputes among leaders
and were resolved by political struggles. 
The fact is that price allocation based on
voluntary contract was superseded by non-
price allocation by the plan, as implemented at
the discretion of the party comrades in charge
of land resources. Typically, planning standards
were employed to resolve competing claims for
land resources and their use. 
According to the “invariance” version of the
Coase Theorem enumerated in “The problem
of social cost”[13], the resource allocation
implications and “efficiency” attained by cen-
tral economic planning would be the same as
those for a free market “capitalist” system if
transaction costs are zero and rights are clearly
delineated. 
Precisely because the transaction costs of a
planned economy are greater than a market
economy[15] and the rights of the party mem-
bers over resources are not clearly specified, the
socialist land use rights system produces results
which, from the market economy’s view point,
are “inefficient”. For instance, massive areas of
land were formed but became vacant because
planned development could not materialize
because of slippages in planning, buildings not
properly managed or maintained, and the like.
Therefore, land use rights reforms formed part
of the economic reform packages of the Deng
Xiao Ping era.
Reversion to private property rights
The “hot” issues in the development of the real
estate market in China in recent reform years
include:
• the legislative innovation of transferable
“land use rights” as distinct from inalienable
“land ownership”[5];
• the establishment of the institution of land
auction, tender and grant[6];
• the hectic construction and sale of residen-
tial units in the Pearl River Delta and in
major cities, notably Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou and Shenzhen[30];
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• the listing of state enterprises with huge land
holdings on the Hong Kong Stock
Exchange[1]
It has been argued by Ratcliffe[23] that “land
use rights” were separable from “land owner-
ship” or “ownership rights” and hence tradable
by auction, tender, negotiation and private
treaty. The relevant legal provision is contained
in Clause 4 of Article 10 of the Constitution of
the People’s Republic of China, which was last
amended in April 1988 to read: 
no organization or individual may appropriate,
buy, sell, or lease or unlawfully transfer land in
other ways. The right of land use can be trans-
ferred in accordance with the law.
Many scholars brought up in the common law
systems interestingly adhere to a literal inter-
pretation, which is indeed also the official
rationalization, of this amended clause. They
regard it as having the effect of retaining the
“ownership” of land in the hands of the state
(or “the people”), upholding therefore the
socialist doctrine of nationalization of the
“means of production” (land resources in this
case). This is the view of Walker and Li[5] and
was explained in greater detail by Ratcliffe[23]:
The focus being on separating land ownership
from the rights to occupy and use land lies at the
core of urban land use system reform in the PRC.
The problem being not so much the public
ownership of land itself, but the irrational and
profligate way in which the property rights system
has been operated. Thus, the path of land system
reform will not alter the basic principle of public
land ownership, but rather revise and improve the
system of property rights in terms of such matters
as the most suitable legal representatives of public
ownership; the separation of land ownership and
land use; and the identification of clear relation-
ships between the various parties concerned
defining their rights, responsibilities and interests
[author’s italics].
Such views confuse the reader and have a lot of
theoretical problems. First of all, if “owner-
ship” and “rights” were separable, then one
would have to accept an absurd legal concept of
X having “ownership” of land without any
“rights” in it (the same logic applies equally to
the conventional distinction between “owner-
ship” and “possession”). As argued above,
“ownership” signifies a social relation.
“Rights”, denoting the nature of certain social
relations, are indeed the substance of “owner-
ship”. In other words, “rights” and “owner-
ship” are conceptually inseparable. The doc-
trine of “estate” in the English land law embod-
ies such ontological concepts. 
A freeholder has a seisin in land rather than
“owning” land. According to the Osborn’s
Concise Law Dictionary, “seisin” means “the
relation in which a person stands to land or
other hereditaments, when he has in them an
estate of freehold in possession”. To recapitu-
late, the proprietor in a private property rights
system, has three types of exclusive rights:
rights to use, to derive income and to transfer.
All such rights, notably the rights to transfer,
are now legally valid in China. The Provisional
Regulations on Granting and Assigning Land
Use Rights in Urban Areas in the PRC promul-
gated by the State Council in May 1990 form
the basis of the “land use rights” reform in
practice. These regulations provide a basis for
the granting and assigning of leaseholds in
urban state-owned land across the country.
Land users, including state enterprises, must
hold leaseholds before their interests in land
may be assigned, leased or mortgaged. The
terms of the lease are normally 70 years for
residential, 50 years for industrial, educational,
scientific and technological, culture, public
health and sports, 40 years for commercial,
tourism and recreational; and 50 years for
combined or other purposes. 
Walker and Li[5] are correct in saying that
the “land use rights” reform creates the PRC-
equivalent of the Hong Kong leasehold 
system, a point first recognized by Cheung[15].
They could indeed take one step further affirm-
ing that “this is a legal reversion to private
property rights”. Leasehold, like freehold, as a
form of land tenure is full private property
rights, bearing the three characteristic rights.
The difference between leasehold and freehold
is that the rights of the former are exercisable
within a pre-determined period (i.e. the term of
years) whereas the rights of the latter are exer-
cisable within a period which is not pre-deter-
mined (but which is determinable by eminent
domain[31]) where the state sees fit. 
In fact, before such de jure private property
rights were recognized by edict, China had,
since the inception of the liberalization policy,
adopted de facto private property rights for rural
land by replacing the compulsory commune
and production team systems by a voluntary
“responsibility system”[32] under which a
peasant family could, after paying its due to the
state (i.e. a kind of tax), retain income derived
from agricultural uses chosen freely by the
family. 
Cheung[15] argues that with the current
legal establishment of tradable land use rights,
and official attempts to re-allocate “national-
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ized land” by the market mechanism of auction
and tender, China is clearly on the road to
capitalism based on private property rights.
The fact that this material reversion to pre-
revolution private property rights, official
rhetorics notwithstanding, is replete with
problems, should not confuse the basic direc-
tion of change. The growth of the property
market as indicated by the volume and speed of
land and unit transactions[30], is strong evi-
dence of the re-establishment of private proper-
ty rights. The booming manufacturing indus-
tries built on such landed property are reminis-
cent of those in Charles Dickens’ novels. 
Instead of expending energy in artificially
juxtaposing or attempting to reconcile logically
untidy and incompatible “mixed ideology”
concepts, the researcher would do better to
focus on the evolution of the institution of
private property rights in land and their 
prerequisites. 
One key prerequisite is the rule of law, as
property rights delineated need to be duly
interpreted and enforced. The Chinese Gov-
ernment’s success in reverting to private prop-
erty rights is largely in the sphere of initial
delineation and legal recognition of such rights.
The subsequent reassignment and enforcement
of these rights remain a big problem area. 
Another prerequisite for the operation of
private property rights is the technical measure-
ment of rights. This aspect entails huge transac-
tion costs in real estate surveying, valuation and
registration. Mckinnell et al.[2] remind the
reader that “ideologies die hard”. This is quite
true. However, if ideologies are interest-based,
then this reminder is but a reminder that the
law of economics is always at work! Whether
the Chinese “road to capitalism” will end up as
a “passage to India”[15, 16] characterized by a
system of endemic corruption, would not alter
the fact that it is re-establishing a system of
private property rights, be it in India or Hong
Kong.
Conclusion
As Coase[12] pointed out, clear delineation of
private property rights is the prelude to mar-
ket transactions. The “land use rights” reform
of China is in substance seeking to re-estab-
lish the abolished private property rights
system in the form of leasehold tenure. This
endeavour, however, is often overlooked
because of a confused interpretation of official
socialist jargons. Researchers in property
valuation and management interested in the
Chinese property market should, in this
context, pay particular attention to the devel-
opment of the rule of law in this country, as
private property rights cannot function effi-
ciently in the absence of a well established
legal system. Besides, the history and proce-
dures of the leasehold system of Hong Kong,
and its supporting common law system,
should provide the Chinese reformers with
many useful insights and examples.
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